INTRODUCTION
The study of Chile's modern economic history usually generates a sense of excitement and sadness.
Excitement, because during the last 50 years
Chile has been a social laboratory of sorts, where almost every possible type of economic policy has been experimented; sadness, because to a large extent all these experiments have ended up in failure and frustration.
The most recent of these "experiments" began in 1973, after the military overthrew President Salvador Allende. In the ten years following the coup, the military implemented deep reforms directed towards transforming
Chile from an economy semi-isolated from the rest of the world, with strong government intervention, into a liberalized world-integrated economy where market forces were freely left to guide most of the economy's decisions.
These liberalization reforms were carried out at the same time as a major stabilization program, aimed at reducing a 60O percent rate of inflation was being implemented. Many of the policies undertaken roughly correspond to what a vast number of economists have been advocating for developing countries --trade was liberalized; the capital account was (partially) opened; interest rates were freed and an active domestic capital market was developed; the fiscal system was reformed with a value added tax replacing a cascading type sales tax; the social security system was reformed; and the private sector began to play a more active role in the growth and development process. was not sustainable. The inflow of foreign capital was halted, the foreign debt could not be paid, real interest rates skyrocketed, and a severe financial crisis erupted. These events, and a drastic deterioration of the terms of trade --which amounted to 26 percent between 1979 and 1983 --, provoked one of the worst recessions faced by the country, from which, at the time of this writing, it still has not fully recovered.
In addition, a number of the reforms were partially reversed: tariff rates were hiked; capital movements were forbidden; the financial sector was plagued with bankruptcies, and was virtually nationalized. 1/ A number of economic puzzles have emerged from this experience, including the extremely high interest rates that prevailed throughout the episode and the persistence of unemployment. Also, the ultimate failure of the experiment has added considerable interest to the analysis. Here the most relevant question --which has far-reaching policy implications for other developing countries --is whether this failure was a consequence of the liberalization policies themselves, or if it was the result of other events, including foreign shocks and inappropriate macroeconomic policies.
In this paper, an attempt is made to provide some clues for answering this question. The analysis concentrates on some of the more controversial -3-aspects of the experiment --opening of the external sector and real exchange rate appreciation, interest rates behavior, and stabilization policies in an open economy --, and tries to extract some lessons of experience that could, in principle, be applicable to other countries. This paper, then, does not provide a comprehensive account of the Chilean experiment with free market policies. This is deliberate, since at this time a number of such general interpretations are available, and the reader is referred to them. 2/ By focusing on some specific --and especially controversial --aspects of this experience it is hoped that a better understanding of this episode will be obtained.
The paper is organized in the following form. In Section I, the behavior of the real exchange rate and its relation to the liberalization of the capital account is investigated. that provoked the real appreciation and, in conjunction with other elements --like the full indexation of wages to past inflation --generated the subsequent crisis. 4/ In this section the behavior of the real exchange rate is analyzed, and it is argued that the main cause of the real appreciation was related to the massive capital inflows that followed the liberalization of the capital account in 1979. Some regression results reported provide support to this hypothesis. It is further argued that while the adoption of a fixed rate --at the same time that wages were fully indexed to past inflation --was a policy mistake, it was not a major one.
In Table 1 quarterly data on the behavior of the effective real exchange rate between 1977 and 1984 are presented. An increase in this index reflects a real depreciation, whereas a decline shows a real appreciation. As may be seen, between 1977 and the second quarter of 1979 --in spite of the fact that the so-called tablita was in effect --there was actually a slight real depreciation of the peso. 5/ However, starting in the third quarter of 1979, and up to the second quarter of 1982 a continuous and steep real -5-appreciation was observed, which at the end of the first quarter of 1982 had accumulated to 22 percent. In the second quarter of 1982, the fixed exchange rate system was abandoned and a succession of devaluations followed. The fixed rate was first replaced by a system where the exchange rate was pegged to a basket. This was soon replaced by a floating system, which in turn was quickly replaced by a crawling peg. This system is in effect at the time of this writing. Between the abandonment of the fixed parity and mid-1984 a real effective depreciation of almost 13 percent has taken place. 6/ Although the domestic capital market was reformed in early 1975 --with interest rates being freed and the creation of new financial institutions allowed --foreign capital flows were strictly controlled until mid-1979. In
June of that year a process of liberalization of the capital account of the balance of payments was begun; restrictions on medium-and long-run capital movements were lifted. The final steps in this process were taken in April of 1980 when additional regulations regarding the maximum monthly inflow of foreign capital were relaxed. 7/ Short-term capital movements, however, were forbidden throughout most of the experiment. In July of 1982, and for a brief period of time thereafter, short-term inflows were also allowed.
Even though throughout most of the experiment only medium-and longterm capital movements were permitted, the opening of the capital account resulted in extremely large inflows of foreign capital. In 1980, capital inflows more than doubled with respect to 1979, and in 1981 the level of capital inflows doubled again. In Table 2 , biannual data on net capital inflows in U. Banks, however, were not allowed to take the exchange risk; all their loans financed with foreign funds were documented in foreign exchange. The final borrower was subject to the devaluation risk. These regulations generated a highly segmented credit market, where only scme agents had access to the "relatively cheap" credit denominated in foreign exchange.
The massive inflow of foreign capital experienced between mid-1979 and mid-1981 was the main factor behind the real appreciation of the peso. In fact, the absorption of these foreign funds required a real appreciation.
From an analytical perspective, the reason for this is that, to the extent that a fraction of the net inflowing capital is spent on nontradable goods, an incipient excess demand for this type of goods will emerge; in order to restore equilibrium, nontradable goods' relative prices will have to increase, and a real appreciation will result. 8/ This was indeed the case in Chile,
where a large proportion of the newly imported foreign capital was used to finance a dramatic boom in the construction sector.
The fact that a real appreciation is actually required to absorb an increase in the level of net capital inflows, introduces an important element in the discussion of the Chilean experience. This means that the 1979-1981 real appreciation was a short-run equilibrium phenomenon. It was an equilibrium phenomenon in the sense that, given the level of the capital This provokes a portfolio disequilibrium in the developed countries, since investors now want to hold a significantly higher fraction of the liberalizing country's capital stock as part of their portfolios. As a result, immediately following the liberalization, capital inflows into the country will jump. As time goes by, however, and the portfolio imbalance in the developed countries is solved, the flow of foreign capital into the country will slowly decline towards its new long-run equilibrium.
Alternatively, we can think that during the period of capital controls a large stock disequilibrium had developed, with the desired level of foreign debt well above its actual level. In this setting, once the capital account is opened, there is a tendency to solve this stock disequilibrium fairly fast.
This will result in massive inflows of foreign funds in the short run. The existence of a fixed nominal exchange rate since June of 1979 made things even worse. First, the slow (approximate) convergence of domestic inflation towards world inflation, after the exchange rate had been fixed, generated additional forces towards a real appreciation. 12/ Second, and more important, the coexistence of a fixed exchange rate and 100 percent indexed wages made the adjustment required once capital inflows declined, extremely difficult. The reason for this is that while the absorption of large amounts of capital inflow requires a real appreciation, the reduction (or reversal) of capital inflow requires a real depreciation to maintain equilibrium. As reflected in Table 2 , starting in late 1981 the rate of capital inflows experienced a steep decline. Since the nominal exchange rate was fixed, the adjustment of the real exchange rate required to cope with the lower rate of capital inflows had to take place through a decline in the nominal price of nontradable goods and of real wages. The problem, however, was that due to the indexation mechanism incorporated into the labor law of 1979, real wages were virtually inflexible downward. At this point it became apparent to most observers that a fixed exchange rate and the real wages policy were highly inconsistent, and that their coexistence represented a policy mistake. As Before late 1981, the fixed exchange rate did not constitute a serious mistake. As may be seen, under both specifications, the coefficient of the lagged value of net capital inflows is significantly negative as expected.
HQwever, the value of the coefficient is not very large, suggesting that it would take a significant change in the rate of capital flows --as in Chile --to generate large variations in the real exchange rate. 15/ It can also be seen from the results reported in equation (2) that the coefficients of the terms of trade variable is negative as expected. The coefficient for real growth, however, turned out to be positive and insignificant, suggesting that the Ricardo-Balassa effect did not play an important role in determining the behavior of the real exchange rate in Chile during this period. Finally the coefficient of the lagged dependent variable was fairly high under both specifications, indicating that after a shock the real exchange rate.moved only slowly towards its new equilibrium. This is, in some sense, not surprising given that these regressions were run using quarterly data. In sum, the results presented here provide support to the hypothesis that the real exchange rate has been negatively affected by the rate of capital inflows in Chile.
One of the most important consequences of the real appreciation of the peso was that the tradable goods sector suffered an important loss of competitiveness, and that a large number of firms ran into serious financial trouble. Most of these firms faced these problems by resorting to heavy borrowing from the financial sector, exercising a significant pressure on the -13-demand for credit and on interest rates. As the magnitude of the real appreciation increased, it became apparent for most economic agents that the fixed exchange rate system was not sustainable. These beliefs fueled, towards mid-and late 1981, expectations of a significant devaluation, which were translated into even higher interest rates. In addition to the loss in competitiveness generated by the real appreciation, the extremely high interest rates and the depressed domestic demand, especially after 1981, The data on nominal interest rates presented in Table 3 
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Equation (8) is the demand for real money. Finally, equation (9) depicts the process through which monetary equilibrium is achieved.
Combining (3) through (9) Moreover, the degree of financial openness of this country will be related to the value of 61. If 6 =1, and 62 63 6 =0 (10) becomes the open-economy interest arbitrage condition. In the Chilean case, however, it is expected that in a regression analysis both the coefficients of (it+Dt), i.e., 61, and of log mt 1 , i.e., 62, will be significantly different from zero; this would indicate that in Chile during the period under study both open-economy and closed-economy factors played an important role in the behavior of the nominal interest rate.
The estimation of equation (10) Another problem related to the estimation of (10) has to do with the definition of a time series of the expected rate of inflation. In order to simplify the estimation xt was replaced by 1t, the actual rate of inflation. This is a reasonable thing to do under the assumption of rational expectations. And finally, a third serious problem with the estimation of (10) is related to the risk premium term Pt. Ideally one would want to model this term, which will generally depend on the stock of outside assets of the government and on other variables affecting the degree of country risk.
.his, -21 -however, was considered to be outside of the scope of this paper.
Consequently it was assumed that Pt could be expressed as a constant k plus a serially correlated random term t'. ut1 + vt. This means that in the estimation of equation (10) a procedure that corrects for serial correlation should be used. Given the simplifying nature of these assumptions the results obtained from the estimation of (10) should be interpreted with caution.
In the regression a dummy variable that took the value of zero from 1977 to mid-1979 and the value of one form then onwards was introduced in order to allow for some distinction between the fixed and non-fixed rate subperiods. The estimation of equation (10) 
II.2 Real Interest Rates
Not only were nominal interest rates extremely high during the Chilean experiment, but real rates were also dramatically high. As mentioned, the partial opening of the capital account in mid-1979, and the resulting increase in the rate of (net) capital inflows, generated an important initial An approach similar to that used to discuss the behavior of the nominal rate can be used to focus the analysis on the behavior of the real rate. Consider equations (12) through (14) .
. be between zero and one. In equation (13) et is the expected change in the real exchange rate. The real exchange rate, in turn, is defined as e = EP*/P, where E is the nominal exchange rate, P* is the foreign price level and P is the domestic price level. Equation (14) , which is the real rate equivalent to equation (6) above, is the actual real rate of interest in period t. Equation (13) (12), (13) and (14) can be combined to obtain an expression that provides some insights 
III. MONETARISM NOW AND THEN: THE KLEIN-SAKS MISSION VS. THE MILITARY REGIME
In this section the military government approach towards stabiliza- The two stabilization programs also had some important differences.
Two of them are worth pointing out within the context of the present paper. Another area where the government policies were particularly deficient refers to the capital accumulation process. Throughout the period savings and investment was very low; in fact lower than its level in the 1960s. In that regard it was quite apparent from the early stages of the economic recovery 
